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Abstract—5G is enabling different services over the
same physical infrastructure through the concepts and
technologies of virtualization, softwarization, slicing and
cloud computing. Virtual Mobile Networks (VMNs), using
these concepts, provide an opportunity to share the same
physical infrastructure among multiple operators. Each
VMN Operator (VMNO) can have own distinct operating
and support systems. However, the technologies used to
enable VMNs have their own explicit security challenges
and solutions. The integrated environment built upon
virtualization, softwarization, and cloudification, thus, will
have complex security requirements and implications. In
this vain, this article provides an overview of the security
challenges and potential solutions for VMNs.
Index Terms—Security; VMNs security; 5G security
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advent of new technological developments
in 5G such as virtualization and network slicing, Virtual
Mobile Networks (VMNs) will provides an opportunity
to share the same physical infrastructure among multiple
operators. Each VMN Operator (VMNO) can have its
own operating and support systems, service offering
and user base. Being virtual in nature, the network can
be easily scaled up and down as the need arises [1].
Due to vast array of benefits, since 2012 the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) hosted
the industry specification group for Network Function
Virtualization (NFV) to apply the mainstream virtual-
ization techniques to standardized network elements.
Hence, parts or whole of the access, backhaul and core
networks can be virtualized.
NFV enables telecom operators to use commercial-
of-the-shelf (COTS) general purpose network equipment
to satisfy various needs with less costs compared to
specialized purpose-specific dedicated hardware. Hence,
NFV paved the path to separating network functions
from purpose-built devices to be implemented in soft-
ware which could be deployed on general purpose COTS
equipment [2]. This capability of NFV has brought
the flexibility and agility of clouds to communication
networks in terms of facilitating different services on
network equipment [3]. Furthermore, NFV facilitates
dynamic service creation and management in different
network perimeters with much higher flexibility than
legacy techniques [4].
Software Defined Networking (SDN) facilitates virtu-
alized network functions (VNFs) to be placed in different
network perimeters [5], and thus, NFV and SDN have
become highly complementary. A VNF can be any func-
tion performed by a network node implemented solely in
software. Hence, networking and service functions im-
plemented as VNFs can be upgraded, chained, deployed,
re-deployed or removed instantaneously. However, each
of these technological enablers of VMNs, such as SDN,
NFV, and clouds have their own security challenges
and solutions [6]. Even though a lot of work has been
done on security of each distinct technology, very little
attention has been paid to the security of the integrated
VMN environment. Therefore in this article, the security
challenges, potential solutions, and existing security gaps
of VMNs are discussed. This article is organized as
follows: Section II discusses the security challenges and
possible solutions for security of VMNOs along with
the enabling technologies used in this direction. Section
III discusses security management in VMNs along with
trust, privacy and standardization efforts. Section IV
briefly highlights the potential existing challenges and
the article is concluded in Section V.
II. VMN SECURITY CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS
VMNs will use 5G as the underlying infrastructure,
and leverage the concepts of cloud computing besides
NFV and SDN to efficiently place network functions,
scale up resource for different functions when needed,
and provide unified platforms for network management
resulting in Telecommunication network as a Service
(TaaS). Therefore, the security of VMNs will be de-
pendent on security of 5G as a whole, and SDN, cloud
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platforms, and most importantly, virtualization technolo-
gies and NFV in parts. Therefore, we discuss first the
security of 5G in brief and then security of each enabling
technology below.
A. Brief Overview of 5G Security Challenges
The Next Generation Mobile Networks (NGMN) con-
sortium suggests 5G to provide more than hop-by-hop
or radio bearer security, which were common in 4G
and prior generations of cellular networks [7]. Due to
the inclusion of diverse services and technologies the
security threat landscape will be much more different
and complex. The most important challenges, that are
more threatening in the case of 5G compared to previous
generations [7], [6], are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I
MAIN SECURITY CHALLENGES FACED BY 5G
Security
Challenge
Description
Denial of Service
(DoS) Attack
Targeting availability of resources with DoS attacks
on the infrastructure and end-user devices.
Flash network
traffic
Sudden arrival of large number of packets causing a
jamming like service breaks.
Security of inter-
faces
Security lapses regarding interface encryption keys
generated in home network and sent to visited net-
work over insecure links.
User plane in-
tegrity
Lack of cryptographic integrity protection for the
user data plane in cases where the traffic terminates
beyond mobile networks.
Lack of assur-
ance
Security lapses occurring due to lack of security
assurance in multi-operator environments.
Roaming security Conflicts among multiple operators regarding
subscriber-level security policies during roaming,
usually requiring operators to share information.
The security of 5G is dependent on that of SDN, NFV,
cloud platforms, and have characteristics: i) Supreme
built-in-security following the principle of security-by-
design for emerging systems and services, ii) Flexible
security mechanisms leveraging the principles of NFV
and SDN for deploying dynamic security functions, and
iii) Automation leveraging AI for minimal human inter-
vention. As a baseline,the 3GPP has defined a security
architecture with entities outlined in Table II, that could
also solve the challenges mentioned in Table I.
B. Security of SDN
SDN is one of the main enabling technologies of
VMNs since it provides abstractions of the physical
network infrastructure [8]. SDN introduces network pro-
grammability and centralizes the network control to SDN
controllers, thus, the security concerns mostly relate to
these features [9]. For example, SDN enables applica-
tions to program or change the behavior of the network.
TABLE II
MAIN POINTS OF 3GPP SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Security type Description (solution for challenges in Table I)
Network access
security
For secure authentication and access to network
services. (User plane integrity )
Network domain
security
For secure exchange of signaling and user plane data
among network nodes. (Security of interfaces)
User domain se-
curity
For secure user access to a user equipment (UE).
(User plane integrity)
Application
domain security
To enable user and provider domain applications to
securely exchange messages. (User plane integrity,
security assurance, roaming security)
Service-based
architecture
domain security
For network element registration, discovery, autho-
rization, and service-based interfaces.
Visibility and
configurability
Security features that inform users of security fea-
tures operations. (DoS, security assurance)
This gives rise to the need of strong authentication
and authorization techniques for applications. Moreover,
the centralized controllers are favorable targets for DoS
and resource exhaustion attacks. Fingerprinting the con-
trollers, for example through time stamps of live packets
in the network [10], or round-trip time [11] have been
demonstrated. Therefore, devolving controller functions
(e.g., local decision-making), hierarchical controllers,
resilience through increased capabilities, and intelligent
security systems using machine learning for proactive
measures have been proposed [9].
SDN can be also used to improve the security of
virtual networks [12]. Virtual Machine (VM) migration
techniques using SDN can help to move resources to
secure perimeters. For instance, live VM migration if
the network is under a DoS attack can efficiently help
in scalability through monitoring the load states (e.g.
packet counter values) in the SDN forwarding plane.
Live VM migration in legacy networks has been difficult
for two reasons. One, network state unpredictability,
and second, VM migration is limited to LAN since IP
does not support VM mobility without session breakups.
SDN solves these challenges through centralized pro-
grammable network control having visibility of global
network state and independence of the layered IP stacks.
Therefore, SDN can improve the security of VMNs.
C. Security of Cloud Platforms
Cloud computing [13] has become a central part of
mobile networks for a number of benefits ranging from
radio access networks (RAN) to core networks [14].
Cloud computing concepts have been extended to meet
latency requirements through edge computing [15], [16],
MEC [17], and fog computing [18]. Virtualization of
the cloud platforms for enabling novel services have
many benefits of costs and efficiency. However, there
are inherent security challenges in cloud platforms that
are highly important when it comes to virtual systems on
cloud platforms. For example, MEC suffer from latency
during authentication, and the existing authorization,
accounting and access control are not suitable for MEC
leaving space to threats, as discussed in [19]. Therefore,
novel techniques for security [19] and privacy [20] in
MEC platforms must be adopted, and novel lightweight
techniques need to be designed for fog platforms.
The two main inter-junction points of cloud and
virtualization for wireless networks are cloud RAN (C-
RAN) [21] and cloud-based core networks [4]. A survey
on C-RAN security [22] outlines the main challenges
and potential solutions. The existing challenges include
the lack of universal C-RAN security framework, secure
sensing techniques, trust and privacy, and the infancy of
physical layer security. Furthermore, C-RAN pools Base-
band units from multiple base stations into a centralized
pool for statistical multiplexing gain [21]. Such central-
ization would invite DoS and other resource exhaustion
attacks. On the core network side, most of the security
challenges are related to signaling storms, DoS attacks,
and the security dependability on SDN and NFV [23].
D. Security of Virtual Machines
A VM might be running one or several different
VNFs. Thus, the security of virtual systems, specific
to the VMNs, is multi-pronged. The security of virtual
systems in VMNs revolve around hypervisor, VMs, and
VNFs. There is also the concept of virtualized threats
that refers to attacks against availability, integrity and
confidentiality of software and hardware in VMN. All the
VMs and hypervisors must be adequately secured from
unauthorized access, change, and other disturbances. In
VMNs, the hypervisor is a central entity that is not
directly connected to users, thus the security threats arise
from VMs. Therefore, similar to other centralized or
core elements, the hypervisor must be protected through
proper authentication, authorization and accountability
mechanisms. Similarly, security mechanisms needed for
availability must be in place since the unavailability
of the hypervisor would be a serious problem for all
services. The reliability of hypervisor requires security
of VMs. Strong isolation mechanisms will be required to
minimize the effects of malicious VMs on one another
and on the hypervisor [24]. Defining and setting different
security zones and traffic separation can also improve
isolation-based security of VMs. However, most of these
security approaches are yet to be seen due to the limited
deployment of VMNs.
E. Security of VNFs
The concept of NFV to implement networking func-
tions in software to be deployed on commodity network
equipment led to the rise of VNFs [2]. Soon novel verti-
cals will span multiple operator environments in the form
of VNFs. Thus, VNFs can have a diverse threat vector.
The security threats can arise from the software imple-
mentations, VNF configurations, security weaknesses in
hypervisors and cloud platforms, as well as direct attacks
on VNFs such as side-channel attacks, flooding attacks,
and malware injection [6]. Due to the dynamic nature
of VNFs, trust management is another serious concern
since VNFs will be capable to move between multiple
networks, and cloud platforms maintained by different
owners and operators [6]. The targets of such attacks
include user traffic, VNF code and policy input, and state
of VNFs. Such attacks can be materialized by exploiting
inherent limitations in operating environments including
its software and hardware [25].
Similarly, serious security challenges can arise from
interfaces, mainly when standardized interfaces are not
defined [26]. Furthermore, the VNF package security
validation check is highly important to avoid introducing
security vulnerabilities in the whole system. Therefore,
there are several proposals for confidentiality check
through proper authentication and integrity verification
for VNF packages onboarding into NFV systems. There
are also other proposals for ensuring security of systems
from malicious VNFs. For example, authors in [27] pro-
pose and demonstrate a verification system for security
attributes of different VNFs to protect NFV infrastructure
(NFVI) using standard TOSCA [28] data models.
III. SECURITY MANAGEMENT IN VMNS
Due to the dynamic nature of NFVI and VNFs, se-
curity management is highly complex VMNs. The com-
plexity is due to consistent maintenance and management
of VNF configurations and seamless transfer of state
information from one VNF to another [29]. Similarly, the
elasticity of NFV brings forth challenges in decomposing
services for data and control planes, enforcing policies,
and managing and controlling the entire network where
control signals must go only through the trusted func-
tional blocks such as VNF managers, VIM, and NFV
orchestrator [30].
The ETSI specification release 3, security management
and monitoring specification [31], provides important
insights into security management and monitoring prob-
lems. It states that traditional security systems will not
scale for NFV, may result in inconsistent policies, inef-
ficient processes and increase overall complexity. Moni-
toring in NFV deployments is highly complicated due to
possibly concealed interfaces by consolidated verticals,
functional silos, and collapsed stacks like shared memory
and virtual sockets. In large-scale deployments, probing
for security monitoring is complicated by the myriad
of VNFs, vendor-proprietary implementations, and non-
3GPP standardized interfaces, as well as automation and
live migrations.
ETSI proposes a high-level security management
framework [31], as shown in Fig. 1, to meet these
requirements. From top, the NFV Security Manager
(NSM) copes with complexity, separation of domains,
and consistency challenges for security management of
network services. Security Element Managers (SEMs)
manage different security functions. Tailored security
functions are implemented as VNFs called Virtual Secu-
rity Functions (VSFs). VSF can be a firewall, Intrusion
Detection/Preventions System (IDS/IPS), etc., and can be
used to protect other VNFs as well. A security function
provided by the NFV Infrastructure (NFVI) is called
NFVI-based Security Function (ISF) that can include
software, hardware or virtual security systems. Part of
the non-virtualized traditional network, Physical Security
Function (PSF), is the hybrid (virtual and non-virtual)
network and is managed by SEM instead of VIM. PSF
is added to provide full security; however, it is not part
of the fully virtualized environment.
Fig. 1. High-level NFV security management framework.
The overall security management is provided by NSM
which is also involved in security policy planning. The
NFVI Security Manager (ISM) is a security management
function in the NFVI layer that builds and manages
security in NFVI to support NSM request for managing
security of network services in higher layer. However,
there should be security controls and security policies,
and clear security principles defining privileges for dif-
ferent functions. The security monitoring of VMNs will
involve monitoring of management, services and systems
of VMNs. The management security monitoring include
monitoring of attacks, deployed security policies, and
monitoring of operation behavior of the environment.
The service security monitoring includes monitoring
interfaces and handling of service procedures (e.g.,
signaling). The system security monitoring has many
prongs such as monitoring system integrity, logs, traffic,
resource usage, and security management processes. The
monitoring techniques can be either passive, active or
a combination of both. However, security monitoring
of dynamic VNFs will be challenging. For example,
tracking the traffic of moving functions and services
will require synchronizing different network systems and
functions. Furthermore, trust establishment will be very
important in VMNs as described below.
A. Trust Establishment
Trust and privacy will be primary concerns in shared
environments.Trust in communication networks is about
the expected outcomes of communicating with remote
entities. Trusted networking encompasses questions of
losing data or assets, network resources, and privacy dur-
ing communication [32]. In VMNs, trust establishment
can be rather tricky mainly because of sophisticated tools
over the network used to hide identities. One of the basic
approaches to ensure trust over the network is strong
identity binding techniques starting from the locator/ID
split of communicating devices [33]. Raimo Kantola
in [33] described the potential pitfalls and possible
mitigation principles and techniques with great detail
for 5G/6G. In VMNs, the case is same with the only
exception that tracking in virtualized environment will
be more challenging than the physical counterpart.
B. Privacy
Any information from which a person or attributes of a
person can be identified must be kept private. Generally,
virtual networks support privacy since information from
a big number of people is not directly linked to anyone
person. There are even methods that create virtual users
to enhance privacy of individuals over communication
networks as presented in [34]. However, in VMNs the
control of user over his information is much lower, and
can be barely traced to know where the information
actually resides. This links privacy of users in VMNs
to privacy in cloud systems. There are a number of
approaches that can be used to secure privacy in virtual
systems in clouds such as described in [35], [36], [20].
C. Standardization Efforts
The 3GPP working group, i.e., SA WG3 [37] is
monitoring security of 5G, including virtualization and
NFV, etc. ETSI is more fucused on NFV and virtual-
ization. Thus, the ETSI Industry Specification Group for
NFV [38] is working on security with a dedicated group
called the ISG NFV Security group (ISG NFV Sec).
The latest, 2019-2020, NFV release 4 covers the ver-
ification, and certification procedures and mechanisms.
The ISG NFV Sec group has published several group
specification documents related to security such as access
token specification for API access [39], VNF Package
Security Specification [40], Security Specification for
MANO Components and Reference points [41], report
on NFV Remote Attestation Architecture [42], and on
security management and monitoring specification in re-
lease 3 [43]. Furthermore, there are several other reports
on privacy, regulations, and trust guidance.
IV. OPEN RESEARCH AREAS
There are many open research areas in securing
VMNs. Since the deployment is very limited, more secu-
rity concerns will arise as we move forward towards its
practical use. The potential challenges and open research
areas can be grasped from Table III. The challenges in
Table III, based in ITU-T security recommendations, are
listed from low (L) to medium (M) and high (H). The
challenges are more threatening where there are few
resources with respect to the security implication. For
example, access control is more threatening in SDN since
unauthorized access to the SDN controller can lead to a
hijack of the whole network. Yet, the control platforms
are not cable to have heavy security mechanisms due to
scalability challenges, as compared to centralized cloud
platforms. Therefore, access control will have higher
security implications in SDN than cloud platforms. The
challenges are labeled low, where there is no direct
implication of the particular challenge on the technology.
For example, availability of a VNF can be a security
challenge, yet VNFs can be created and moved around
different resources at run-time without compromising on
running flows. Therefore, it is considered as a lower
(L) challenge, even though in the ultimate sense every
challenge must be considered as high, e.g., for trust.
V. CONCLUSIONS
VMNs will share the same physical infrastructure
with many operators including MNOs and VMNOs.
TABLE III
SECURITY DOMAIN IMPLICATIONS AND CHALLENGE LEVEL IN
EACH TECHNOLOGY
Security Domain Technologies Trust
SDN cloud VMs VNF
Access Control H M M M H
Authentication H H H H H
Non-Repudiation M M L L H
Data Confidentiality L H L L H
Communication security H L L L H
Data integrity L H L L H
Availability H M L L H
Privacy L H L L H
Therefore, the security environment will be complex, and
dependent on security of enabling technologies and other
operators. New security concepts must be brought forth
that can secure both MNOs and VMNs at the same time.
Strong isolation techniques, secure management, and fast
and efficient monitoring systems will play an important
role. Since, the deployment of VMNs at a large level is
very limited, the security threats cannot be fully realized.
However, security-by-design will be the key to secure
and safe operation of future VMNs.
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